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Abstract
We conduct an experiment to assess the eects of dierent decision rules
on the costs of decision making in a multilateral bargaining situation. Specif-
ically, we compare the amount of costly delay observed in an experimental
bargaining game under majority and unanimity rule. Our main nding is
that individual subjects are more likely to reject oers under unanimity rule.
This increased rejection rate, as well as the requirement that all subjects
agree, leads to more costly delay. This result provides empirical support for
a classic argument in favor of less-than-unanimity decision rules put forth by
Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
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11 Introduction
What proportion of a decision making body should be required to agree in order
to arrive at a collective decision? In their classic work, The Calculus of Consent,
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argued that an important factor to consider in this
context concerns the expected costs of reaching agreement under dierent rules.
While requiring unanimous consent protects individual members from adverse de-
cisions, this rule may be associated with larger costs of reaching agreement than
others, such as simple majority rule. According to Buchanan and Tullock, rational
individuals may prefer to use less-than-unanimity decision rules in order to reduce
these expected \decision costs". Their argument is reviewed in more detail in next.
The goal of the present paper is to compare the costs of reaching agreement
under majority and unanimity rule in the context of an experimental bargaining
game. Subjects in our experiment were asked to agree on a division of a monetary
amount among three players. The rules of the game (explained in detail in section
3) specify that bargaining proceeds over several rounds. Failure to agree in a given
round causes the available \pie" to shrink by a certain amount. Thus, delay in
bargaining is costly.
We investigate the extent of such costly delays under majority and unanimity
rule. Our main nding is that individual subjects are more likely to reject oers
under unanimity rule. This increased rejection rate, as well as the requirement that
all subjects agree, leads to more costly delay. Thus, unanimity rule is associated
with higher costs of reaching agreement. On the other hand, unanimity rule tends
to produce more equal distributions, and all players receive a positive share of the
available surplus. These results provide empirical support for the existence of the
tradeo assumed in Buchanan and Tullock's seminal analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Buchanan
and Tullock's argument in more detail. Section 3 describes our experimental design
and relates it to previous experimental literature. We present a model of our exper-
2imental game and describes our hypotheses. Results are presented in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Decision rules and decision costs
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) consider a rational, self interested individual who
chooses a decision rule to be used by a decision making body such as a committee.
The rule will be used to decide on collective activities within some previously dened
realm of collective action.1 The choice of decision rule is made in a constitutional
stage during which the individual nds himself behind a veil of uncertainty. This
means that he does not know precisely what his position on future issues will be, and
believes himself equally likely to occupy any position within the relevant society. It
is assumed that the individual seeks to choose the rule that maximizes his expected
utility from this constitutional perspective.
Buchanan and Tullock argue that the individual should consider two categories
of \costs" to be expected under each decision rule. The rst category includes
costs resulting from collective decisions that change the status quo in a manner
that runs counter to his own interests. The authors refer to these as \external
costs." If the decision rule species that any single member of the society can
unilaterally make a decision, the expected harm that such decisions will impose on
the individual is maximized. On the other hand, if unanimous agreement is required
for all decisions, no harm can be imposed on him. Thus, the expected external costs
of future decisions are decreasing in the size of the majority required for agreement,
reaching zero when unanimous agreement is required (See gure 1, reproduced from
Buchanan and Tullock (1962: 70)).
1It is important to emphasize that the analysis assumes the existence of additional constraints on
collective actions that may be decided upon. Buchanan and Tullock emphasize that the preferred
decision rule is likely to depend on these constraints, i.e. it will dier depending on the kind of
decision making body and the range of activities it has the power to undertake.
3FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Absent further considerations, this argument would imply that the use of una-
nimity rule maximizes the individual's expected utility from future decisions. The
reason is that (a) this rule guarantees that only Pareto improving collective actions
will be undertaken, and in fact (b) all Pareto improving actions can, in principle, be
unanimously agreed upon. It follows that no opportunities for mutually benecial
agreements would be left unused.2
This conclusion would rest, however, on the assumption that unanimous agree-
ment, if possible in principle, will in fact be achieved at no cost. This would seem to
require that any collective action that in principle could achieve unanimous support
is in some way automatically proposed and voted on without requiring any active
investment of time or other resources by any of the participants. Buchanan and
Tullock emphasize that this line of reasoning neglects the importance of the process
necessary to prepare and agree on mutually benecial proposals.
The process of proposing and voting on proposals is bound to involve costs not
only for logistical reasons. Another consideration emphasized by Buchanan and Tul-
lock is that each opportunity to engage in an ecient project implies the existence
of a surplus that can be distributed in any number of ways. Thus, each such oppor-
tunity raises a kind of \pie-splitting" problem, and each member will seek to secure
as large a share of the available surplus as possible. According to Buchanan and
2Guttman (1998) objects to Buchanan and Tullock's argument on the grounds that unanimity
rule may prevent \ecient" projects (collective actions) from being undertaken. Specically, a
proposal to conduct a project which promises large benets to a majority at a small cost to a
minority would fail, even if the project increases \aggregate surplus." Guttman argues correctly
that a rational (and risk neutral) individual who believes himself equally likely to occupy any
position in society would prefer, on expected utility grounds, that all such \ecient" projects be
undertaken. What Guttman's argument neglects, however, is the fact that the \eciency" of such
projects immediately implies that there must exist some proposal to undertake it (e.g. one which
includes a compensation to the minority) which could, at least in principle, achieve unanimous
support.
4Tullock, this leads the members of a decision making body to invest resources (e.g.
time) in otherwise unproductive bargaining activities. They hypothesize that these
wasteful investments in bargaining will tend to grow as the decision rule becomes
more inclusive (1962: 68-69).
This hypothesized relationship is illustrated in gure 2. When any single
member of the society can make a decision, no bargaining is required, and the
costs of decision making are minimized. In the extreme case of unanimity, each
individual member has the power to veto any decision. This introduces a kind of
hold-up problem: each member may withhold agreement in order to force others to
make concessions. This maximizes each individual's incentive to invest in bargaining
and therefore decision costs are maximized.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
To the extent that more inclusive decision rules increase the likelihood that
individuals will withhold agreement, they will be associated with greater \decision
costs" due to delays, haggling, etc. A rational individual will perceive a trade o
between the reduction in \external costs" associated with more inclusive decision
rules and the resulting increase in \decisions costs". For this reason, she may prefer
to use less-than-unanimity rules.
In our view, Buchanan and Tullock's argument is based on important empirical
hypotheses concerning the behavior of individuals in dierent institutional contexts.
Specically, they hypothesize that unanimity rule motivates individual members to
withhold agreement and invest in wasteful bargaining activities.
Absent further evidence, it is a priori not obvious that this should be the
case. Granted, if individual group members were equally likely to consent to a given
proposal under both rules, unanimous consent would less often occur than majority
consent. One might therefore argue that unanumity rule logically implies larger
decision costs. However, this argument neglects the fact that both the proposals
being made and the likelihood with which an individual gives her consent may
5depend on the decision rule being used. In particular, it is at least conceivable that
an individual would be more likely to consent to a given proposal under unanimity
than under majority rule, perhaps to avoid decisively causing the proposal to fail.
If so, the probability that a proposal passes may be the same as (or larger than) it
is under majority rule.
In contrast, Buchanan and Tullock hypothesize that individual group members
will in fact be less likely to give their consent to a given proposal under unanim-
ity rule. Their argument is that, by giving each member a veto, unanimity rule
maximizes incentives to \act tough" and bargain for a larger share of the surplus
created by an ecient action. If true, this \increased toughness" eect of unanimity
rule would imply additional decision costs over and beyond those which are implied
by the statistical calculation outlined above. The goal of the present paper is to
experimentally investigate this claim in a controlled laboratory setting.
3 Experimental Design
Following an established experimental literature on multilateral bargaining, we base
our experimental design on the classic legislative bargaining game introduced by
Baron and Ferejohn (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). The Baron-Ferejohn (henceforth
BF) game is an extension of the Rubinstein bargaining model to the case of more
than two players.
3.1 The Baron Ferejohn Game
At the beginning of the game, a certain surplus is available to be divided among the
players. The game consists of a potentially innite number of bargaining rounds.
In each round, one player is randomly chosen to propose a division of the currently
available pie. If a simple majority accepts the proposal, the game ends and each
player receives his allocated amount. If not, the pie shrinks by a certain factor and
a new round begins. Thus, the costs of bargaining consist of the lost surplus if
6agreement is not reached in a given round.
The main theoretical predictions of interest in our context are the following (see
Section 4 for details). First, proposers form minimum winning coalitions, allocating
positive payos only to the number of subjects required for agreement. Second,
the distribution of proposals within a winning coalition is unequal, favoring the
proposer. Third, the rst proposal is immediately accepted. Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) also derive hypotheses concerning the dierent behavior under closed vs.
open amendment rules. These hypotheses are not directly related to our paper and
will therefore not be discussed here.
The main hypothesis we wish to test in this paper concerns the dierences in
behavior under majority vs. unanimity rule. In particular, we want to test Buchanan
and Tullock's argument that unanimity rule protects individuals from external costs
imposed on them by others while leading to increased decision costs in the form of
delays.
Note that in the BF game, no external costs can actually be imposed on an
individual participant even under simple majority rule. That is, only non-negative
amounts can be allocated. Still, if we consider the share an individual can expect to
receive under unanimity as a benchmark, majority rule implies the risk of incurring
an opportunity cost if one is excluded from a winning coalition. Thus, unanimity
rule ensures that no individual can be forced to accept less than a given (e.g. equal)
share, but it introduces the danger of costly delay.
3.2 Previous Literature
Previous experimental studies have tested these and other predictions of the Baron-
Ferejohn game. The rst experimental paper on the subject was McKelvey (1991).
In this experiment, groups of three bargained over a distribution of odds for a chance
to win a monetary prize. Failure to agree led to a loss of 5% of the stake.3 He nds
3This method of payment is used to induce risk neutrality.
7that coalition partners received larger shares than predicted by theory, and proposals
passed more often than predicted. (That is, proposals o the predicted equilibrium
path which would be rejected according to the predicted equilibrium strategies were
in fact accepted.) Fr echette et al (2003) use groups of ve with a discount factor of
0:8 (i.e. 20% of the pie is lost when a proposal fails), repeating the game 15 times.
Consistent with theory, they nd that proposers form minimum winning coalitions
and proposals pass immediately. However, distributions within the winning coalition
are more equal than predicted. Fr echette et al (2005a) use groups of three and
compare discount factors 0:5 and 1, repeating 10 times. (Note that  = 1 implies
that bargaining costs consist only of the time that subjects spend in the laboratory
until agreement is reached.) They nd that rst round proposals are more likely
to fail when the pie does not shrink. Fr echette et al (2005b) use groups of 5 and
no discounting. Fr echette (2009) proposes a learning model to account for the data
in Fr echette et al (2003). Diermeier and Morton (2005) use groups of three and
play a nite horizon version (5 rounds) with no discounting, repeated 18 times.
They nd that proposers allocate more money to other players than predicted, and
a signicant percentage of rst round proposals above the theoretical continuation
value are rejected. Diermeier and Gailmard (2006) introduce dierent reservation
values into the game.
The paper most closely related to our own is Kagel at al. (2010). These
authors use groups of three, with discount factors 0:95 and 0:5. The focus of their
analysis is the eect of introducing a \veto player" into the interaction. As the term
suggests, this player (who may be a proposer or a responder) has the right to block
any decision that is passed by a majority. This modication is closely related to
our use of unanimity rule, as unanimity rule eectively means that every member of
the group is a veto player. A key dierence between this approach and ours is that
veto power is asymmetric in Kagel et al's context. Accordingly, their focus is on the
extent to which veto players can successfully convert this asymmetry in power into
a more favorable bargaining outcome. One of their main results is that veto players
8indeed receive larger shares, both as proposers and as non-proposers. Another result
of interest in our context is that introducing a veto player results in greater delay
and therefore less ecient outcomes.
We build on this existing literature by introducing unanimity rule in the Baron-
Ferejohn framework. Thus, we contribute to the previous experimental literature
by comparing behavior under majority and unanimity rule. In addition, our main
goal is to test the Buchanan-Tullock hypothesis stating that unanimity rule leads
to more investment in costly bargaining. Specically, we focus on dierences in the
frequency of rejections under the two rules. Section 3 describes our experimental
game in detail and formulates the hypotheses to be tested.
3.3 Model and Benchmark Hypotheses
Our experimental design is based on the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model intro-
duced above. Specically, we implement the following bargaining game involving
three players, henceforth labeled A, B, and C. The game consists of a potentially
innite number of bargaining \rounds."4 In each round, one player is chosen at ran-
dom to propose a distribution (xA;xB;xC) of the currently available \pie". Here, xA
denotes the share of the pie allocated to player A, etc. All players are then informed
of this proposal and vote either yes or no. Under majority rule, the proposal is
passed if at least 2 players vote yes. Unanimity requires that all three players vote
yes. If the proposal passes, the game ends and the players receive their allocated
shares. If the proposal fails, the game moves to the next round and a new player
is chosen to make a proposal. This delay is associated with a cost because the pie
shrinks to  times its previous size each time a round ends without agreement. (In
the experiment, the pie is initially worth 20 GBP and shrinks by a factor of 10% at
the end of each round, i.e.  = 0:9.)
4The experimental version is actually a nite game. As will become clear, this does not aect
the analysis and benchmark solution derived here.
9We derive a symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Denote the size of the pie in round t by Pt = t  P. Let vt be the expected
continuation payo if the proposal is rejected in round t. (Note that this value is
the same for all players in a symmetric equilibrium.) Assuming that players vote
\yes" when indierent between accepting and rejecting, the proposer in round t
must give a share worth vt to another player in order to secure her vote. Under
majority rule, the best he can do is to give this amount to one of the other players
and keep Pt   vt for himself. Under unanimity, he must give vt to both of the
other players and keeps Pt   2vt. In each case, the entire pie will be distributed,
and the proposal will be accepted. Since each player is equally likely to receive
any given share of tomorrow's pie, the expected continuation payo after round t
is vt = 1
3Pt+1 = 
3Pt. It follows that under majority (unanimity) rule, the proposer
oers a share 
3 to one (both) of the other players and keeps the remainder for
himself, and this proposal is passed. (Under majority rule, the player excluded from
the coalition can vote either yes or no.) In particular, this is true for round one,
implying that the equilibrium involves no delay in bargaining under both majority
and unanimity rule. If instead we assume that players vote \no" when indierent
between accepting and rejecting, the proposer must raise his oers by the smallest
available increment. In our context, this is 1% of the available pie. This analysis
leads us to formulate the following benchmark hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Under simple majority rule, the rst proposer oers a share 
3 (30%
in our case) or 
3 +  (31%) to one other subject and keeps the remaining 70% or
69% for himself. This proposal is immediately passed. (Either the proposer and the
included subject or all three subjects vote yes.)
Hypothesis 2 Under unanimity rule, the rst proposer oers a share 
3 (30%) or

3 +  (31%) to both of the other subjects and keeps the remaining 40% or 38% for
himself. This proposal is immediately passed.
103.4 Predicted treatment eect
Comparing hypotheses 2 and 3, we see that the baseline solution predicts a treatment
eect when we compare simple majority and unanimity rule. In particular, we expect
that the size of the coalition receiving positive amounts is 2 in the rst case and 3
in the second. Second, we expect that the distribution within the coalition is highly
unequal in the rst condition and approximately equal in the second.
Our main hypothesis concerns delay, which is actually not predicted in the
theoretical benchmark. We hypothesize that unanimity rule will more often lead
to proposals being rejected. More precisely, we conjecture that any individual par-
ticipant is more likely to reject a given proposal if unanimity rule is in eect than
under majority rule. As explained above, the reason is that unanimity rule creates
incentives for subjects to \act tough" in order to get a larger share of the pie, while
majority rule creates incentives to be \modest" in order to be included in a minimum
winning coalition.
Hypothesis 3 Non-proposers are more likely to reject a given proposal under una-
nimity rule than under majority rule. More specically, let the proposer's share be
xP and consider a responder being oered a share xR. Then, controlling for xP and
xR, the responder is more likely to reject a proposal under unanimity rule than under
majority rule.
Note that hypothesis 3 is stronger than the related (and equally important)
idea that a given proposal may be more likely to pass under majority rule. The
latter statement would be true even if the individual likelihood of rejection were
the same under both rules, simply because two subjects are more likely to accept
than are three. Evidence to support hypothesis 3 would therefore indicate an ad-
ditional source of decision costs, over and beyond that which is directly implied by
the tougher requirement that all subjects agree. We interpret Buchanan and Tul-
lock's argument as referring to this additional cost, which results from an increased
tendency to bargain for a larger share of the surplus.
113.5 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The
participants were undergraduate and graduate students from dierent disciplines at
a large UK university. Participants were recruited using the online recruitment
system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Participants were not informed about the purpose
of the experiment. Each subjects were allowed to participate only once. For each
treatment there were 2 sessions involving 12 subjects per session.
We used the strategy method (Selten 1967) to record both proposers' and
voters' behavior. Every participant in a group made a proposal, and each proposal
was voted on. Finally, one proposal was randomly chosen to be counted. If the
chosen proposal passed, bargaining ended. If it failed, the pie shrunk and a new
round of bargaining began. Bargaining also ended if the amount remaining to be
distributed fell below 2 GBP. After each round of bargaining, subjects received
feedback that consisted of the three submitted proposals, the number of participants
that accepted/rejected each proposal, whether the proposals had been passed, as well
as which proposal had been randomly selected for votes to count.
Each session consisted of 16 periods, one practice period and 15 cash peri-
ods. Subjects were randomly re-matched before each period. At the end of the
experiment, one of the 15 cash periods was randomly selected to be paid. Their
total earnings in the experiment consisted of the amount allocated to them in the
period chosen for payment and a 4 GBP participation fee. Sessions lasted 1 hour
on average. Instructions are reproduced in the supplemental material.
4 Results
The data comprise 4 experimental sessions involving a total of 48 subjects. Each
session lasted for 15 periods. Half of these decisions were made in the majority
condition and half in the unanimity condition.
Depending on the proposal selected to be voted on, the length of a period is in
12part a random occurrence. As a consequence, we do not have many observations for
second and later rounds, despite the fact that many rst round proposals do in fact
fail. Following the previous literature, the analysis will therefore focus on behavior
in round 1 only. Given that each subject makes a rst round proposal in each of
the 15 periods, we have a total of 41215 = 720 proposals. Each proposal is voted
on by all three members of the group, giving us a total of 3  720 = 2160 voting
decisions made in round 1. Our analysis of voting behavior will focus on the 1440
decisions made by non-proposers.5
4.1 Rate of passage
Figure 3 reports the proportion of proposals which pass in round 1. Pooling the data
from all 15 periods, 87% of proposals are passed in the rst round under majority
rule.6 Under unanimity, only 70% of proposals are passed in round 1. There are
no trends in the acceptance rate over the course of the experiment. The dierence
in passage rates between majority and unanimity rules is signicant at 5% level
(Z = 2:0475, p = 0:0406).7
This result provides initial support for the conjecture that there is more delay
and therefore the decision cost is higher under unanimity rule than under majority
rule. Below we test the even stronger prediction, posited in hypothesis 3, of a higher
5Due to a program glitch, 12 proposals and 27 voting decisions were not recorded. As a con-
sequence, our empirical analysis uses only 684 proposal and 1386 non-proposer voting decision
observations. The program error was not noticeable to subjects and did not aect the progress of
the experiment.
6This high rate of passage is in line with results reported in the literature. For instance,
Frechette et al (2005a) nd a 89% acceptance rate in round 1 for inexperienced subjects and
 = 0:5.
7We use a two-group test of proportion that uses the result of the vote in a period as the unit
of observation. This test may overestimate the signicance level because it assumes independence
of sample observations. As a robustness check, we replicate this result using a linear regression
model and controlling for the period (p = 0:043).
13propensity to reject oers under unanimity at the individual level. Before turning
to this hypothesis, we present evidence on the types of proposals made under the
dierent rules.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
4.2 Types of Proposals
Figure 4 plots the share proposers demand in round 1. Under the unanimity rule,
99% of proposers demand shares within the range 31% to 40%. Only 11% of pro-
poser's demands are, however, at the equilibrium prediction of 38% to 40%. Thus,
proposals under unanimity rule are less favorable to the proposer than predicted by
the theory.
Under majority rule, less than one fourth of the decisions fall in the 31% to
40% range, and there are peaks at 50% and 60%. Thus, it appears that proposers
typically propose minimum winning coalitions. However, very few proposers demand
the predicted share; less than 5% of proposers demand more than 68%.
Under both rules, we nd patterns very similar to those reported on in previous
literature. Proposers demand a higher share than they allocate to non-proposers,
but the dierence is still far from the equilibrium prediction.
Next, we look at the dierences between unanimity and majority rule. Using a
random eect linear regression, and controlling for the period, proposer's demands in
the unanimity and majority conditions are statistically dierent at any conventional
signicance level.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
These dierences between the rules emerge over time. Under majority, it
takes a few periods for proposers to learn to demand a higher share of the pie.
Figure 5 plots the period average share the proposer demands for herself in round 1.
The dierence between the average proposer's demand in period 1 and the average
14proposer's demand in period 15 is more than 15%. In contrast, we do not observe a
similar change in proposer's demands under unanimity.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
That proposers learn under majority is also obvious when we look at the type
of oers they make to non-proposers. Figure 6 shows the proportion of proposers
oering 0 to one of the non-proposers, as well as the proportion of roughly equal
splits,8 in the 15 periods. Interestingly, approximately half of the proposals in
period 1 are three-way equal splits and only one out of ve allocates 0 to one of the
non-proposers. In the last 10 periods, more than 75% of proposals include a zero-
oer and the proportion of three-way equal splits is consistently below 15%. Thus,
it looks as though many subjects were initially inclined to propose equal splits and
learned over time to form minimum winning coalitions.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
In sum, under majority rule most proposals are of minimum winning coalitions.
The participant not included in the coalition receives a zero-oer (78% of the oers
in the last 10 rounds), and the two coalition members receive a more equal share
than predicted. The average share of a non-proposer coalition member in proposals
that include a zero-oer is 42%. Thus, proposers approximately demand 60% for
themselves, which is slightly less than the equilibrium prediction of 69% or 70%.
Proposals under unanimity are closer to the equilibrium prediction. They are
all approximately equal splits. Although consistent with the equilibrium analysis,
this result may also be due to fairness considerations. Interestingly, however, it
appears that \fairness survives" only in the context where it also corresponds to
equilibrium play.
8Here we consider proposals where two subjects receive 33% and one subject receives either
33% or 34%.
154.3 Rejection patterns at the individual level
We now turn to our main hypothesis, which concerns the likelihood that an indi-
vidual voter rejects a given oer under the dierent rules. This measure is more
informative about expected decision costs than looking at the amount of delay ob-
served, as the latter measure depends on which proposals are randomly chosen to be
voted on. Since we used the strategy method, we have information on the likelihood
of rejection of all rst round oers, irrespective of whether they are chosen to be
voted on or not.
Figure 7 shows votes of non-proposers, by shares oered, in round 1. According
to the theoretical prediction, the expected share of a non-proposer is the same under
majority and unanimity rule, and it is the same in every single period. Thus, non-
proposers should theoretically accept oers above 30% or 31%. This is indeed what
we nd in our data. Under both rules, 90% of non-proposers accept oers above
31%. Using a random eect probit model, we compare acceptance rates for oers
above this level. We nd no dierences between the rules when we control for the
proposer's share, the subject's own share, and the period (see regression 1 in table 1).
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
In contrast, we do see a signicant dierence in the rates of acceptance of oers
at or below the theoretical continuation value. When oers are smaller than or equal
to 31%, and controlling for the same set of variables, we nd a higher propensity to
reject an oer under unanimity than under majority (see regression 2 in table 1).
More specically, 100% of the oers below the equilibrium level and 64% of the oers
at the equilibrium level are rejected under unanimity. Under majority, only 92% and
48% of oers below or at the equilibrium level are rejected, respectively. We also
study the dierence in the rates of rejection at exactly the equilibrium level and nd
the same result. Participants reject an oer at the equilibrium level signicantly
more often under unanimity than under majority (see regression 3 in table 1).
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
164.4 Summary of Results
We nd that under majority rule proposals consist of a minimum winning coalition
and are accepted without delay most of the time. This is in line with Baron and
Ferejohn's original predictions under closed rule. We also nd a deviation from their
predictions that has been replicated several times in the literature: distributions
within the coalition are more equal than predicted. Therefore, we can only partly
accept hypothesis 1.
When unanimous consent is required, proposals are all approximately equal
splits. All three members of a group receive a positive amount and proposers do not
fully exploit their advantageous position. Results under unanimity are closer to the
equilibrium predictions, and we cannot reject hypothesis 2. However, this result is
also consistent with \fairness" motivations.9
Our main hypothesis concerned delay under both rules. At an aggregate level,
we show that proposals under unanimity rule are rejected more often than under
majority rule and, therefore, there are more delays under unanimity. We additionally
show that non-proposers are more likely to reject an oer under unanimity rule
than under majority rule if the oer is not above their continuation value. Under
unanimity, most of non-proposers exert their veto power to turn down proposals
that do not oer them more than their expected value in the next bargaining round.
9As noted above, it is interesting that behavior consistent with \fairness" survives only in the
setting where the \fair" proposal is also close to the equilibrium prediction. A possible interpre-
tation is that subjects have learned, outside of the laboratory, that \fairness" is an advantageous
strategy in social interaction. This hypothesis is initially applied under both treatment conditions.
The treatment dierences in behavior emerge as subjects in the majority treatment revise their
initial hypothesis. Thus it is possible that subjects in the unanimity treatment continue to act on
proximate \fairness" motives, while the decision rule and the associated incentives may ultimately
explain why those motives survive.
175 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to experimentally investigate the relationship between
decision rules on the costs of decision making in a multilateral bargaining situation.
Our research question is motivated by Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) classic argu-
ment in support of less-than-unanimity rules in collective decision making. Their
argument is based on the hypothesis that individual investments in wasteful bargain-
ing activities will increase as the majority required for collective agreement increases.
When compared to simple majority rule, unanimity rule may therefore be associated
with inecient delays. Although unanimity rule protects each member of a decision
making body against adverse decisions, a rational individual may therefore prefer to
use a less demanding decision rule. We investigate the hypothesized relationship be-
tween decision rules and decision making costs in the context of the Baron-Ferejohn
legislative bargaining game.
Our results provides support for the existence of a tradeo of the kind hy-
pothesized by Buchanan and Tullock. Unanimity rule indeed protects individuals
from adverse decisions in the sense that proposals are consistently more \fair" than
under majority rule. Under majority rule, subjects are exposed to a signicant risk
of being excluded entirely from a winning coalition and leaving the experiment with
only the show-up fee. This risk was eectively absent under unanimity rule, where
almost all proposals give at least 30% of the available pie to each member of the
group. However, this increased \security" comes at a price in terms of eciency.
Thus, we nd that a sigicantly smaller proportion of proposals is passed in the
rst round under unanimity rule. In fact, we nd support for the even stronger
hypothesis that individual members are more likely to reject a given share of the pie
under unanimity rule than under majority rule.
The latter pattern in particular appears to provide support for the hypothesis
underlying Buchanan and Tullock's argument. It appears that unanimity rule moti-
vates subjects to be more \bullish" in their bargaining behavior. This is particularly
18evident when we look at proposals at or below the theoretical continuation value of
31%. These oers are signicantly more likely to be rejected under unanimity rule.
The primary goal of the experimental analysis was to test a behavioral hypoth-
esis, and not necessarily to provide or test theories as to the underlying psychological
or strategic mechanisms responsible. None the less, we are inclined to interpret this
pattern as follows. Under majority rule, rejecting a given share of the pie is as-
sociated with the risk of being excluded entirely from future proposals. Therefore
rejection is potentially very costly. This risk of being entirely excluded is absent un-
der unanimity rule. Therefore subjects are more likely to reject, expecting correctly
that they will receive a more attractive oer in the following round.10
A limitation of our approach lies in the fact that the interaction is extremely
structured and the actions available to subjects are severely limited. This makes the
situation somewhat unnatural when compared to \real world" situations to which
Buchanan and Tullock's argument was meant to apply. Such doubts regarding
external validity apply to much of experimental research in economics and political
science. The advantage of such structured environments lies in the fact that we
can clearly formulate hypotheses in terms of quantiable behavioral patterns (e.g.
rejection rates). The disadvantage is that we exclude elements of what Buchanan
and Tullock may have meant by \investments in costly bargaining." Bargaining
activities in real-world legislatures include, for example, verbal exchanges between
members, meetings with lobby organizations and voters, etc. In our context, the
only means by which subjects could engage in costly bargaining was to reject a given
proposal. Future research in planning includes attempts to introduce communication
into the interaction. For example, subjects may be given the opportunity to state
\demands" prior to bargaining. We expect that such opportunities are likely to lead
10We explore this conjecture using the only 22 observations under unanimity where a non-
proposer voted against a proposal, and that proposal was randomly selected to be implemented.
In the rst round, the average rejected proposal was 28%. In the second round, participants that
rejected an oer in the rst round were oered 32% on average.
19to more delay under unanimity rule.
A second issue worth exploring in our context concerns the eect of group
size on decision cost, as well as the interaction of this eect with the decision rule.
Buchanan and Tullock conjecture that, in addition to the eect of the decision rule,
the costs of decision making increase with the overall size of the decision making
body itself. These factors, together, lead them to conclude that unanimity rule
may be appropriate in small groups, while less stringent rules may be preferred in
larger groups. Ongoing research tests this hypothesis in our context by increasing
the group size and otherwise keeping the experimental setup constant.
To conclude, the experiment reported on in this paper provides support for
Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) classic argument in support of less-than-unanimity
decision rules. In particular, we have shown that while unanimity rule protects
individuals from adverse collective decisions, it leads to increased delay as subjects
more often reject proposals in an attempt to gain larger shares of the available
surplus.
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Figure 2: Decision rule and decision costs (based on Buchanan and Tullock 1962)
Figure 3: Proportion of Proposals Passed in Round 1
24Figure 4: Proposer's Share Demanded in round 1
Figure 5: Average Share the Proposer Takes for Him- or Herself in round 1
25Figure 6: Proportion of Subjects Playing the Zero-oer and Equal-Split Strategies
in round 1 under Majority
26Figure 7: Accepted and Rejected Oers in round 1
27(1) (2) (3)
Ownshare > 31% Ownshare  31% Ownshare 2 f30;31g
Unanimity 0.177 -1.136 -1.148
(0.298) (0.492)** (0.509)**
Proposer's share -1.456 -4.750 -4.422
(0.973) (1.389)*** (1.841)
Own share 5.587 8.047
(1.956)*** (1.312)***
Period 0.021 0.058 0.074
(0.016) (0.028)** (0.034)**
Constant -.0171 -0.632 1.666
(0.739) (1.782) (0.883)
Observations 948 438 149
Number of subjects 48 48 43
*** p < 0:01 ** p < 0:05 * p < 0:1
Table 1: Random Eect Probit Estimates of the Voting Decision (Standard Errors
in Parentheses)
28